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EDITORIAL 
we are pleased to present'to the readers of Management Quarterly 
an entirely new sampling of academic papers written by students at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. The papers were selected for their excell-
ence in terms of broad-based appeal, readabil i ty, and informative value. 
The editorial staff wishes to express its appreciation to the 
faculty for their cooperation and assistance in identifying papers 
worthy of publication. 
We wish to especially thank Dr. John D. Senger whose active 
support of this publication is reflected in the volume and quality 
of papers he has continued to recommend. 
In a slight departure from traditional editorials of Management 
Quarterly, the editors wis h to exercise editorial license to provide 
a thank you to a small group of people who provide excellent support, 
not only to Management Quarterly, but to the entire Administrative Science 
student body . These folks smooth the paths of students and lighten their 
workload by coping with the myriad of administrative and clerical pedantics 
required of military students in an academic environment. They provide 
support to the student who has a specific problem in an expeditious and 
low-key manner without creating additional stress, and always in a 
friendly manner. For their exceptionally excellent support, and 
management example, we wish to express our thanks to those persons 
in the Administrative Sciences CUrricular Office. 
Succeeding editorial staffs will continue to consider all student 
papers submitted from every education and research department of the 
Naval Postgraduate School. This policy provides an opportunity for the 
broad spectrum of efforts at the school to be recognized and shared by 
an expanded audience of the future leaders of the U.S. Navy. 
Papers for publication may be submitted to Management Quarterly 
at any time. Suitable papers, research work, and term project reports 
can be submitted by either delivering them to a member of the editorial 
staff, or by mailing them to Management Quarterly, student Mail Center 
(SMC} Box 1499, Naval P~tgraduate School. we believe this journal 
provides a unique opportunity for students to have their research or 
academic efforts recognized. we encourage those who feel that their 
recent academic efforts might be of interest to others to forward a copy 
to SMC-1499. 
Lt. Russell L. cain, MSC, USN 
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Corporate Social Responsibility 
by 
Captain P.A. GIDO, USMC 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the question of social responsibility from 
various perspectives. Starting with an overview of social 
responsibility development in America, the author presents 
various historical definitions of the term along with some 
differing perceptions of where the responsibility rests. He 
then reviews the concept of social responsibility from the 
perspectives of potential long term economic profit of business 
organizations along with the social pressure exerted on businesses 
by society. 
This paper was submitted to Professor John D. Senger in partial 
fulfillment of the course requirements for MN 3105, Organizational 
Systems II. 
Captain Paul A. Gide, USMC, received his Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Business Administration from Villanova University in 
May 1972. He is presently a candidate for a Master of Science 
Degree in Defense Systems Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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The Ch allenge 
In less than three hund~ed years enterprising men transformed 
the virgin forest land of t he North American continent into the 
most technologically advanced and industrialized nation i n the 
world. This n ation was built by men who possessed a strong work 
ethic and a desire to improve the society in which they labored. 
The nation became a melting pot ;; o f people, ideals, and dreams . 
Througho u t the nation's history men have been able to assemble 
resources to overcome problems that at the time seemed insur-
mountable . Who were the me n that built this nation? They we r e 
farmers, laborers , businessmen , philosophers, soldiers, and 
government leaders + Individuals from all walks of life working 
together built this nation. The society of today is radically 
different from the society that the forefathers of this nation 
knew during their lifetime. 
The industrialization of the nation advanced society by 
a quantum leap in a very short time span, but it also created 
new problems for society . Today our nation is confronted wi t h 
a large array of major problems. These include nuclear prolif-
eration, shrinking energy supplies, poll u tion, chemical waste 
disposal, unemployment, decaying cities, lack o f adequate mass 
transit, high inflation rates, and a myriad of others. Some of 
these problems have roots spanning generations, others such as 
nuclear proliferation are relatively ne w. 
Traditionally our society has looked to government (be it 






to solve the major problems of the time. Our society has tended 
to overlook the contribution of private enterprises and individual 
voluntary leadership. Government has no magical powers, it draws 
resources and leadership from the private sector, organizes them 
into a program (solution) and directs that program at a specific 
problem. From the long list of problems that confront ou~ society, 
it has become obvious that government alone cannot solve all these 
problems. During the late 1970's, the growing disenchantment with 
government and the growing disbelief in government's ability to 
solve major social problems, began to cause a grass roots reaction 
in American Society. 
The current Federal administration believes that some of 
the problems facing our nation can be more effectively resolved 
by the private sector. The private sector is being called upon 
to directly participate in the solution of social problems . 
Business is being asked to increase its contritution toward 
social goals. Is the private sector really willing to participate 
in the solution of social problems? 
The purpose of this paper is to present the concepts of 
corporate social responsibility. Various definitions of corporate 
social responsibility will be ex a mined and the major arguments for 
and against business participation in the solution of social problems 
will be presented. This paper approaches social responsibility 
from a conceptual viewpoint. 
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Definitions of social Responsibility 
"What is social responsibility? Q and "What corporate behavior 
does the public really expect of the corporation?" are seldom 
answered questions. "The very term 'social responsibility' is 
so vag ue and indeterminate tha t many economists and businessmen 
are relu c tant to use it for fear of having to define it." 
(McGuire, 615) Business enterprise was once only expected to 
devote its effort to producing and distributing goods and se r vices 
as efficiently as possible . Today the business community is 
expected to promote a variety of social causes in addition to 
their economic purpose. " The demands for ' social responsibility ' 
have provoked extensive discussion and deb~te on what roies, if 
any, business firms should play in t he social system. The novelty 
and variety of these demands have rais~d profound questions about 
the extent to which it is possible or desireable to ves~ in the 
business firm the duty to cure social ills," (McKie, VII} The 
social responsibility of business is still a very contrqv~rsial 
subject. 
The discussion Qf corporate social responsibility in chapter 3, 
Management, did not provide an adequate definition of the term, 
•social responsibility'. Stoner's presentation of the "Concepts 
of Organization or Corporate Responsibility" is mainly drawn from 
Chapter 19 of McGuire•s, Contemporary Manag!ment. McGuire's book 
published in 1974 is a collection of essays. The contributors to the 
section on corporate social responsibility include R. J. Monsen, 







point for research into the topic of social responsibility. 
Monsen defines social responsibility in terms of public 
expectations. (McGuire, 61 7) He introduces the concept that 
business must gauge public opinion regarding business behavior 
and pursue business policies which meet the public expectations. 
If business is interpreting the public expectations correctly and 
reacting accordingly then business is being socially responsible. 
The article written in 1971, states that no definition of social 
responsibility has gained a general acceptance. All of the various 
definitions of social responsibility imply certain "levels of 
activism" and should be explained in that light. (McGuire, 61 7) 
Monsen acknowledges that defining social responsibility in terms of 
public expectations is a simple approach which does not consider 
the corporate leadership or i nfluence in molding public opinion. 
(McGuire, 617) 
Davis presented, in my opinion, the best definition of 
social responsibility: "one definition arises from the fact that 
business is part of a complex and interdependent social system 
in which business actions influence other parts of the system. It 
follows that a responsible businessman, and indeed a responsible 
member of any other type organization, must act with due concern 
for the effects of his decision on the system. Social responsibility, 
therefore, refers to a person's obligation to evaluate in the decision 
making process the effects of both his personal and institutional 
decisions on the ~hole social system. The substance of social 
responsibility arises from concern for the ethical consequences of 
one's acts as they might affect the interest of others .. . Soc i al 
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responsibility moves one large step farther by including institutional 
actions and their effect on the whole social system." (McGuire, 629) 
Davis' definition requires a businessman to consider his actions 
in terms of the whole social system and holds him responsible for the 
effects of his acts anywhere in the system. The organization must take 
into account the external environment. 
The socially responsible organization is one which realizes that its 
decisions affect the welfare of other people and takes the ti.me to find 
out how, and to what extent they will be affected. "With · the recognition 
that a business organization is part of a wider society, its activities 
must be judged against the standard implicit in the wider society. Although 
in legal terms, the responsibility for corporate decisions may be attrib-
uted to a legal fiction 'corporate person'; in moral terms, the responsibility 
for corporate decisions rests on the individual members of the corporation." 
(Atkinson, 131) This contemporary view published last year underscores 
the fact that the decisions of business organizations will be judged by the 
ever changing moral standards of society. 
The standards of a society are represented by its general morality and 
ci:cdified laws. Davis' broad definition of social responsibility considers 
the whole system. "Defined in this way, social responsibility is something 
more than mere compliance with the law, because not all system effects 
of business decisions are covered by law, it is unlikely that they ever 









"Social responsibility has been defined as the incident 
when a corporation volunteers to expend its resources to do 
something not required by law and without immediate economic 
benefits." (Moskal, 54) 
In discussing Monsen's theory of public expectations, Davis 
argues that "social responsibility is more than an intelligent 
anticipation of future public expectations". (mcGuire, 630) He 
views the businessman as an active participant, rather than a 
passive respondent. In other words, the businessman should offer 
leadership in social areas rather than merely responding to 
perceived public expectations. He should contribute his expertise 
to assist the entire society in attaining social goals. 
The exact definition of social responsibility will continue 
to be debated by scholars and businessmen. Its meaning will 
change as society's view toward business changes. The important 
point is that every business must decide what its social 
responsibilities are. This decision cannot be made without 
a basic understanding of the term "social responsibility". Based 
on the concepts that have been presented each individual business 
defines social responsibility in some context. 
Opposing Views 
Stoner's discussion of corporate social responsibility focuses 
on two opposing views of the proper role of business in our society . 
(Stoner, 76) One view follows classical economic theory. Its 
contention is that the social responsibility of a business enterprise 
is solely to maximize profits. The other view contends that a 
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business needs to acknowledge a variety of social purposes in 
addition to its long standing economic objective. This view 
holds that active involvement in the solution of social proble ms 
is a proper role for business . 
Classical economic theory can be traced to Adam Smith. 
His book, The Wealth of Nations (1776) is generally regarded 
as the "germinal book on the subject of economics". (Samue l s o n, 41) 
Adam Smith prop o sed the theory of the "Invisible Hand" . Its 
implications were expressed in the following famous passage: 
"Every individual necessarily labo u rs to render the 
annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally indeed, neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it • •• By 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own ga i n, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, l~d by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the 
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." 
The classical view which evolved from Srnit h• s ideas can 
be simplified into three major points. They are: 
1. Economic behavior is separate and distinct from other 
types of behavior, and business organizations are distinct from 
other organizations, even though the same individuals may be 
involved in business and nonbusiness affairs. 
2. The primary criteria of business performance are economic 
efficiency and growth in production of goods and services, including 
improvements in technology and innovations in goods and services. 
3. The primary goal and motivating force for business 







market competition, which leads the firm pursuing its own self-
interests to an end that is no part of its conscious intention : 
enhancement of the public w~lfare . It need not recognize any 
responsibility to the public to accomplish this result. (McKie, 19) 
A contemporary version of the classical theory was expressed 
by Milton Friedman in Capitalism and Freedom. Stoner identifies 
Friedman as the "most prestigious exponenet" of the classical 
view. The major arguments against any expansion of the classical 
view of social responsibility are summarized in Appendix 1. 
The arguments which have the greatest validity are: the cost of 
social responsibility and the lack of accountability to the public. 
The consumer must ultimately bear the cost of a firm's 
involvement in social programs. It can also be argued that the 
consumer bears the cost of a firm's noninvolvement in the solution 
of social problems. The consumer has a very limited capability 
to influence social projects sponsored by business. A business is 
accountable to its owners and stockholders for its actions. In the 
book, The New Industrial State, J. K. Galbraith expressed skepticism 
about managerial responsibility and the suitability of private busi-
ness corporations as agencies for realizing social goals. In 
Galbraith's opinion, large corporations must come under much more 
comprehensive social control before they can meet social needs. 
Many firms have been impugned for adhering to the classical 
theory. Business has been widely criticized, sometimes from 
within its own ranks, for failing to respond in more enlightened 
and generous terms to the full range of needs of the society 
from which it draws its wealth. Critics of business have pointed 
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to many instances of neglect of, or insensitivity to, considerations 
other than those offering short term private advantage." (Heald, 7) 
Business must be concerned with growth and survival over the 
long run. A business policy which is based solely on maximizing 
profits and ignores all other social responsibilities seems 
doomed to failure in the long run because today's society 
expects more of business. 
Expanded Social Role 
The opposing view to the classical economic theory sees a 
more active involvement of business in the solution of social 
problems. "Managements of all institutions are responsible for 
their by-prodnots, ths is, the impacts of their legitimate 
activities on people and on the physical and social environment. 
They are increasingly expected to anticipate and resolve social 
problems." (Drucker, 312) 
Robert Owen is generally singled out as the first to expand 
the role of business from profit maximization to active participation 
in the solution of social problems. "Owen recognized the 
employer's stake in the health and well-being of his workers 
and the manufacturer's interest in adequate wages for the laborer. 
Humane conditions within the factory, decent circumstances of 
housing and living, provision for the education of the community's 
children, all in Owen's vision, were woven into the seamless web 
of a healthy and productive society. All his own experience 







workers was profitable, as well as charitable." (Heald, 4) 
The social responsibilities of business have been discussed 
sinced Owen's time. A discussion of social responsibility 
can be found in almost any text on general management. 
The earlier discussions of social responsibility centered 
in three areas. One was the question of the relationship between 
private ethics and public ethics. The second was the social 
responsibility which the employer bears toward his employees 
by virtue of his power and wealth. The third area was the 
leadership responsibility of the businessman with respect to 
the "culture of the community", philanthrophy and willingness 
to serve in government. (Drucker, 313) 
When the social responsibilities are discussed today, the 
emphasis is very different. The emphasis is on what business 
should do to tackle and solve the problems of society. These 
problems range from racial discrimination to preservation of 
the environment. "More than ever, companies are under pressure 
by shareholders, consumer groups and government agencies to 
engage in socially responsible activities," (Cowen, 10} 
The major arguments for social responsibility are summarized 
in Appendix 2. Davis' "Iron Law of Responsibility" is referred 
to in the summary and deserves special attention. The Iron Law 
of Responsibility states, "that in the long run those who do 
not use power in a manner that society considers responsible 
will tend to lose it." (McGuire, 630} "The law's application 
to man's institutions certainly stands confirmed by history. 
Although the 'long run' may require decades and even centuries 
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in some instances, society ultimately acts to reduce power 
when i t is not used responsibly." {M~Guire, 630) 
"We are entering an era where corporations will be subject 
to greater public scrutiny than they have ever known, where the 
public may well insist that they establish their very right 
to exist." (Daprix, 692) A business is only part of a larger 
external enviro nment. It must be able to interact with the 
external enviro nment if it is to prosper. "T h e reality is 
blunt and conclusive. Society is dependent on business. 
Business is depende n t on society. The corporation cannot 
realistica l ly or rationally divorce itself from society•s 
covenants. Socially constructive corporate action will in the 
long run benefit all of society. Irresponsible action or inaction 
will boomerang to harm business as well as the nonbusiness sector." 
(Linowes, 4) 
"Government" and "Big Business" are regarded as the two 
dominant organizations in American society . The current ~dmins-
tration desires to enlist the aid of "Big Business" in solving 
social problems. Is "Big Business~ willing to accept the challenge? 
What are the limits of corporate social responsibility? 
Limits of Corporate Responsibili t y 
"It is the success of the business system which leads to 
new, and in many cases, exaggerated expe c tations. The demand 
for social responsibility is, in large measure, the price of 






disagree sharply over the parameters of social responsibility. 
The problem of identifying social responsibilities is aggravated 
by: 
1. The fact that public expectations of business are 
constantly changing, and 
2. respective social roles of business and government 
are becoming less distinct. (Strier, 119-121) 
It is even more difficult to identify the responsibilities 
of any given firm. Few social and political guidelines for 
acceptable social action exist. How can management identify the 
social responsibilities of the firm? 
Managements' first step should be to conduct a review of 
presently-held social values. This should be a critical self 
examination. It must begin at the highest levels of the firm. 
The so c ial values of top management must be shared with key 
personnel at the operating level of the firm. Members of a 
corporation must know where top management stands in relation 
to social responsibilities . The management must establish 
specific social goals and a policy to attain those goals. 
"The firms social responsibilities can be further identified 
through the use of: l . categorization; 2. internal social 
audits; 3. forecasting; 4. management re-education programs; 
5. joint conferences; and 6. constituent groups represented 
by public board members." (Strier, 126) Once a corporation 
identifies and adknowledges social responsibilites, it must 
then decide how to respond. 
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A corporation can exercise its social respo nsibility in various ways. 
It can le nd some of its personne ~ to serve on co mmunity projects, finance 
the traini ng of unskilled personnel, contract with minority businessep even 
when its needs could be met elsew here, or perhaps improve the environment 
surrounding its facilities. There is an endless list of ways for business 
to participate in the solution of social problems. Perhaps an innovative 
approach from the private sector will provide the insight to a problem that 
defies the sol utions that government has employed in the past. 
However , before a business can exercise its social responsibilities 
in any manner, it must show a profit and maintain a rate of growth . 
(Chamber l ain, 6) It is doubtful that a business will voiuntarily undertake 
actions that are not in the best interests of its owners, managers, and 
workers. Nor will it participate in clearly unprofitable ventures for any 
length of time. 
The proper role of business in pursui ng socia l responsibilities lies 
somewhere between the two oppoijing views of profit max;imization and all 
out involvement in solving socia l prQblems. This is not a fence strad l ing 
cop out. It is a realizatiQn that business can assist in the solution of 
~ social problems, but its invo l vement is limi t ed by economic !ea.lity . 
A study group on business soc i al responsibili t y sponsored by the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED} has expressed the essence of this 
limited responsibility very nicely: 
"Corpor~tions are necessari l y limited by various internal 
constraints on what and how much they can do to i mprove society 
.•• cost benefit .considera t ions are a very important factor. 
No company of any size can willingly incur costs which would 
jeop~roize its competitive ~osition and threaten its survival • 
••• This means that substantial investments in social improvements 
will have to 9ontribute to earnings, and the extent of such 
earnings will be a major facto r in de t ermining the mix of a 






Since "Big Business" is a dominant force in our society, it has in 
many respects an obligation to the greater society of which it is a part. 
Society and business are interdependent. "Big Business" cannot afford to 
completely divorce itself from its social obligations. The Iron Law of 
Responsibility demands that successful organizations recognize their 
responsibility to the entire society or face censure by the society. The 
demand for business to engage in socially responsible activities is increasing. 
Business can make important contributions toward the advancement of our 
society. "The voluntary sector is today more critical to America than 
ever before because the nation's international and domestic needs are 
growing daily, and people are beginning to realize that national resources 
are finite and that government cannot solve every social ill." (Dayton, 19) 
corporate social responsibility exists in our society and can be 
defined as the moral and ethical values which influence corporate decision 
making. Corporations are increasing their involvement in socially oriented 
activities in order to meet public expectations. However there are limits 
to corporate social responsibility. Economic reality demands reasonable 
profit and growth. Society acknowledges these as valid economic objectives. 
Additionally, society expects business to contribute leadership and resources 
to the solution of social problems. The proper role of business must be 
social as well as economic. 
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Appendix l 
Major argwnents against the expansion of Social Responsibility: 
1. Violates profit maximization. 
2. Cost of social responsibility is too great and would increase prices 
too much. 
3. Business lacks the social skills needed to solve social problems. 
4. It would dilute the primary purpose of business. 
5. Business lacks accountability to the public. Thus the public would 
have no control over its social involvement. 
6. Such business involvement lacks broad public support. 
7. Business already has too much power. Such involvement would make 
business too powerful. 
8. It would weaken the U.S. balance of payments because the price of 
909ds will have to be increased to pay for social programs. 







Major arguments for the expansion of Social Responsibility: 
l. It is in the long run self-interest of the firm to promote and 
improve the communities where it does business. 
2. It improves the public image of the firm. 
3. It increases the viability of the business system. Business exists 
because it gives society benefits. Society can amend or take away its 
charter. This is the "Iron Law of Responsibility". 
4. It is necessary to avoid increased government regulation. 
5. Society expects it. Socio-cultural norms require it. 
6. Codified law does not cover all circumstances, business must 
assume responsibility to maintain an orderly legal society. 
7. It is in the owners (stockholders) best interest. The stock 
market will view the firm as less risky and open to public attack. 
8. Society should give business a chance to solve social problems that 
government has failed to solve. 
9. Business has the human and financial resources to solve social problems. 
10. Problems can become profitable. 
11. Let business attempt to solve problems before they become too great. 
Extracted from Chapter 19 of McGuire's Contemporary Management. 
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Technology Transfer: What is it? What can it do for me? 
by 
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GARY W. STRAWN, USN 
ABSTRACT 
This article presents a personal and rather humourous examination of the 
relatively ,new concept of technology transfer. The author provides succinct 
views of the subject from research, management, and public sector perspectives. 
He then explores the legal issues and the impact of the options an inventor 
in the U.S. confronts in implementing new technology. The author posits 
that the technological inplementation gap is greatest in the international 
setting and provides an interesting example of technological modification 
required to capitalize on excess labor in less developed countries. Lcdr. 
Strawn concludes that technology transfer abounds everywhere, and the more 
we recognize it in our daily lives, the more effectively we can implement 
it and increase our industrial productivity. 
This paper was submitted to Professor John D. Senger in partial fulfillment 
of the course requirements for MN 3105, Organizational Systems II. 
Lieutenant COD11M11der Strawn, USN, received his Bachelor of Arts Degree 
in social Science from San Jose State in 1968. He is presently a candi-
date for the Master of Science Degree in Material Manageuent at the 







If the essence of the scientific method is objectivity, and 
if objectivity is defined ·as the absence, or at least, the control 
of preconceptions and prejudices, then I have a distinct advantage. 
Not only do I not have any preconceptions about the subject of 
Technical Transfer, I don't even know what it is. Oh, I have heard 
the words, and as a student working towards a Master of Science 
Degree in Material Management, I have even tried to nod intelli-
gently when a professor used them. Although I would be the last 
to claim any understanding of the subject. I am interested in 
learning about any applications the study of Technology Transfer 
may have in my business, aviation maintenance. 
The purpose of this paper then, is the synthesis of current 
professional and academic literature on the subject of technical 
transfer, in order to determine what it is all about, and what 
useful application I might make of this body of knowledge. 
TECHNICAL TRANSFER: A DEFINITION OR SIX 
A logical place to begin would seem to be with a definition. 
Professor Creighton defines Technology Transfer as "a purposive 
conscious effort to move technical devises, materials, methods, 
and/or information from the point of discovery or development 
to new users." (Creighton 1972) Alternately, it has been described 
as "a human characteristic", "the selling of licenses", "the moving 
of a number of processes based on scientific knowledge from one 
person or group of persons to another", or that which "takes place 
when a group of people, usually belonging to one body, become 
capable of performing one or several functions attached to a 
specific technique in satisfactory conditions". (Seurat 1979) 
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Another author defines it as the ''processes whereby research knowledge is 
transferred operationally into useful processes, products or programs ~hat 
fulfill actual or potential public or private need,s". (I,.inhares i976) Th_e 
United States Senate Subcommittee on Science and Technology in it~ Report on 
Policy and Planning for Technology Transf~r of 6 April 1967, gave the 
following definition. Technology Transfer is the "process o~ matching 
solutions in the form of existing science and engineering knowledge to 
problems in commerce or public programs". (Strasser 1974) 
The dictionary definition of technology is "the scienc_e of the 
application of knowledge to particular purposes", and "the total means of a 
people to provide itself with the objects of its material c~lture". Transf~r 
is defined as the conveyance as with a title, a chang~ in ownership, or as is 
done with an image or picture which is impsqed from on~ me~ium to another. 
(Websters 1961) 
It is not my intention to select any definition as being mo~e ~ccurate 
than the others or to ridicule the wide variance of perce~veq ~eanings. 
Rather, I iii!\ struck with the fact that this top~c qovers a wide spectrum of 
applications and the v~riety of qefini~ions merely reflects the va~iety of 
backgrounds and interest areas of the authors. Researqh anq D~yelopm~n~ 
people see technology transfer as a means by- which their produqt is sold 
or distributed, to the users: the productiqn or operat~ons d~partments, 
corporate legal departments and governement bureaqcrats see it as proprietary 
problems surrounded by legal rights such ~s patents and ~ont~acts. Industrial 
entrepreneurs see it ~s the vehici~ for economic growth a}lQ the c~ptt~listic 
method by which inovation is utilized to fill society's needs. Legislators 
and government leaders see ~t as~ problem of utilizing the huge gov~rnment 






World leaders and students of international relations view technology transfer 
as the means by which the underdeveloped countries can benefit from the in -
dustrial and scientific advances of the modern world and thereby be brought 
into the mainstream of the world's economy. 
For the sake of organization, I will approach the subject matter from 
each of these varying view points. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
AN R & D VIEWPOINT 
Here is a group with vested interests in the topic if there ever was one. 
Technology, and the advancement of it, is the reasearcher's livelihood. They 
may be considered the "pushers" of technology. They are the broadcasters, 
but at least some of them feel that their broadcasts are not being picked up 
by a sufficient number of turned on receivers. In his article on this subject, 
the head of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC} R&D Department, 
states his belief that the R&D community has reached a point of diminishing 
returns with respect to pushing technology. "Only top management can make 
the necessary changes to ensure adequate reception of the technology being 
broadcast." He concludes that top management is predisposed to the obtain-
ment of concrete goals ~ith limited budgets, and has little remaining energy 
for the promotion of long range abstract concepts such as Technology Transfer. 
He recommends, in typical R&D fashion, a serious research effort into the factors 
which might improve the reception end of the technology transfer process. 
(essoglou 1980) A technology for Technology Transfer? 
MANAGEMENT'S VIEWPOINT 
Top management is confronted by Technology Transfer in a number of ways. 
If it is a large enough organization to have an R&D division, then a positive 
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environment which encourages the utilization of the R&D product by the other 
components (pull), is necessary if the R&D is to be worthwhile. Without a 
specialized R&D section , the new ideas or innova ti ons may come from withi n 
the corporation as suggestions from employees or consultants. It can also 
come from external sources such as other corporations, universities, research 
organizations or government agencies. Examples of these four sourc e s of 
commercial technology transfer may serve to demonstrate the critical importance 
of technology transfer in successful corporate management. 
An excellent example of successful corporation to corporation technology 
transfer was the entrance of Texas Instruments (TI) into the transist or 
business in the early 19SO's. Prior to 1952 , TI was a small instrument 
company with no experience in semiconductors. In the spring of 1952, after 
attending a Bell Systems symposium on semiconductors, TI commenced engineering 
and research work. Aided by the defection of a Key Bell researcher and the 
support of the head of Bell's semiconductor development effort, TI became the 
world's leader in semiconductor capability by 1953. The resultant sales from 
this technology was estimated at $750 million in 1971. (White 1974) 
An example of government to corporation technology transfer is the 
development of the C011lll\erical jet airliner by Boeing from Air Force bomber 
technology . At the time, the ~irlines were not receptive to jet technology, 
but Boeing's president, in a stint of entrepreneurial perseverance between 
1951 and l953r convinced the Air Force of the worth of a jet tanker/transport 
by building a prototype 707/KC-135 at $15 million of company expense. The 
Air Force made its initial order for KC-135 1 s in 1954, and Pan American 
followed a year later with commercial orders. It was entrepreneurial effort 
by Boeing which took a company whose major livelihood had been in producing 





in commercial transports. It took years for the competition, 
Douglas, to come on line with the DC-10 which imitated the 707's 
technology, and Lockheed has never regained its previous status 
held by the reciprocating engined Constellation. (White 1974) 
Battelle Institute procured and developed xerographic tech-
nology in the late 1940's. Through entreprenurial initiatives 
on the part of management, both of Battelle and Haloid Corporation 
(later Haloid Xerox), an agreement to commercially develop and 
market the Xerox copier resulted in a $2 billion industry by 1971. 
It took a combination of the technology of Battelle and an $87.6 
million industrial commitment, operating at a $44.5 million loss 
over seven years, by Haloid to produce the success. (White 1974) 
Finally, an example of university to corporation technology 
transfer is the development of the electronic computer by Remington 
Rand, with technology developed by the University of Pennsylvania 
for the Army Ordnance, Ballistics Research Laboratory in 1946. 
The university researchers started a computer corporation and 
developed the UNIVAC in 1951. Remington Rand bought them out, 
and with the additional capital committment ($12 million), the 
first machine was sold to the Government Census Bureau in 1952. 
Late that year the machine predicted the outcome of the Eisenhower 
0 election, and the computer age was off and running. Univac led 
the industry through the mid 1950's. Computer sales exceeded 
$9.6 billion by 1971. (White 1974) 
It may only be a coincidence, bu~ it seems strange that all 
of these examples of Technology Transfer which led to major changes 
in our society as well as returning healthy profits to the entrep-
reneurs who supported them, occurred 25 to 30 years ago. This 
may be a result of the reduction in government R&D funding from 
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two percent of the Gross National Product in 1970 to one percent 
in 1977 or it may be a function of the lack of turned on receivers 
as discussed by Linhares. rn any case, encouragement, if not 
outrig h t exploitation of i nn ovation h as been t he basis of success 
of th e traditional American Entrepreneur. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The federal budger for research and development was approxi-
mate l y $22 billion in 1976 (Federal R&D Program FY76); $2.9 
billion for space, $11.4 billion for defense, and $7.4 billion 
in FY81. (Dept. of Commerce 1981) It has been estimated that 
over half of the civilian R&D efforts were for the event u al 
benefit of private industry or state and local governments. 
(Linhares 1976) Therefore, the vertical transfe r of this know-
ledge is fundamental to the successf ul accomplishment of the mission. 
In the larger case of the defense and space, R&D efforts are 
primarily for in-house consumption. The transfer 0£ their developed 
technologies horizontally within the organizations is necessary 
for the accomplishment of their goals. However, in a gre a ter 
sense, the purpose of all government research is to benefit the 
public who is paying hhe bill. The spin-off or secondary benefits of 
all government research can be considerable. Velcro, Tang, and 
the semiconductor electronics industry are all examples of the 
secondary benefits of space technology. 
The Naval Material Systems Command (NAVMAT) currently has 
a techno l ogy data bank valued in excess of $700 million. (Grossen 
1981) With new Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to lower 






military hardware, enhance the commercial industrial base of the 
nation, and remove the barriers or adversary roles which have 
developed between government and industry (DEPSECDEF 1981) there 
is now a major push within NAVMAT to enhance the transfer of 
their technology base. The data base comes from three basic 
sources: publicly owned research centers such as the Naval 
Research Laboratory, publicly funded research performed by 
civilian institutions, or proprietary technical information re-
tained from the research and engineering efforts of the contractors 
in the process of developing Naval weapons systems. (Grossen 1981) 
In any case, whether the technology was gained by pure research, 
or as a spin-off from some systems development, much of this 
data can have applications to other Navy, DoD, Federal or local 
government, or civilian organizations. 
The leaders of our government are concerned that the public 
is not getting the full benefit of the technical and scientific 
knowledge which they pay for, but the problems in making this 
happen are two-fold. The government technical community must 
be made aware of the needs and desires of the potential users so 
that research can be directed towards these needs and/or the 
resulting data presented or made available in a useful form. 
Secondly, the potential users must be given the tools whereby 
they can access or query both the existing data and those directing 
current or future research. (Linhares 1976) 
Congress is also quite interested in enhancing the utilization 
of the vast amounts of technology owned or obtained by the govern-
ment. Beginning with the Civilian Industrial Technology Program (1963), 
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and the Office of State Technical Services in the Department of 
Commerce (1965), Congress appropriated money to enhance the 
utilization and intergovernment transfer of technology. Through-
out the late sixties and seventies, six bills dealing with 
technology transfer and utilization of government held scientific 
data were considered by congress. Specific failures were a result 
of the complexities of legislating such efforts and not to be 
interpreted as any lack of concern for the problem. (Underwood 
1977) 
The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, 
and Priorities Act of 1976 established the Office of Science and 
Technology (OSTP), and the Office of Intergovernmental Science 
and Publich Technology within the National Science Foundation, 
and set national priorities fo~ the furtherance of Technology 
Transfer throughout both the public and private sectors. 
1976) 
(Linhares 
Specifically, the Office of Intergovernmental Programs has 
established a series of networks of Rotential user~ of the public 
technology base. Based on geogr~phic divisions, these "innovation 
groups" consist of interested personnel from various public sector 
organizations who work together to identify problems and screen 
sources of science and technology for solutions and applicable 
techniques. 
The more recent policy directives emanating from the .Reagan 
Administration are providing increased impetus for technology 






THE LEGALITIES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
In the four examples used previously in the section on manage-
ment's perspective, the huge financial gains were relatively 
unencumbered by legalistic claims and patents. This has been 
attributed to thefact that in two of the cases, Boeing and Univac, 
much of the initial technology was under government contracts. 
In the case of TI, Bell actively pursued developers for its 
patented semiconductor technology. Only in the Battelle/Haloid 
transfer was there a significant sharing of the profits. (White 
1974) The fact remains, however, that technology is a valuable 
asset which deserves to be protected as well as exploited . In 
a larger sense it can be argued that while the inventors or owners 
of a technology deserve some remurneration, society as a whole, 
deserves to benefit from the fruits of its culture. Seurat 1979) 
There are four options open to an inventor in the United States 
today. He may opt for total secrecy and suppress the new tech -
nology for fear of upsetting the status quo. He may attempt to 
develop the t echnology while keeping it secret within the company. 
An example of this approach might be an innovation in production 
line machinery which could be easily kept secret whereas infringe-
ment on patent right, if that option was selected, would be nearly 
impossible to prove. The patent option provides limited monopoly 
rights for seventeen years, but can require expensive legalistic 
enforcement. The other option is full disclosure which gives up 
all direct financial claims, but may bring secondary benefits in 
the form of advertising and a corporate image of industry leader-
ship. (Elsasser 1977) 
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Within the public sector, proprietary rights may be writte n 
into contracts for a variety_ of reasons. NAVMAT has traditionally 
used this method to avoid being locked into one supplier for a 
commodity or weapons system. If the contractor defaults or 
cannot meet follow-on requirements, ownership of the technology 
base will allow NAVMAT to bring new contractors into t~e field. 
It can also provide insurance against excessive price increases 
for follow-on support or additional applications . Such policies 
have led to a proliferation in the government's data base . 
It can be argued that such a policy adds excessively to the cost 
of the contracts and has a secondary effect of stifling incentives 
for further developments. (Grossen 1981) Under the Reagan 
Administration, there is a push within DoD to reduce the use 
of proprietary rights in hardware and software contracts and 
thereby increase the incentives for Defense contractors and to 
expand the industrial base. (DEPSECDEF 1981) 
SOME RAMIFICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A nation wide survey of universities and colleges found that 
only twenty offered courses pertaining to Technology Transfer. 
The courses were offered by a variety of academic departments 
r anging from Psychology and Sociology through Business Admin-
istration, Agriculture, Engineering, Journalism, and Political 
Science . A common thread through eighty percent of the courses 
was a concentration on the international perspective . (Schuelke, 
e t al. 1978) This predominance of interest does not seem to be 
r eflected in the quantities of literature available, but suffice 






portion of the overall topic. The disparity in technological 
development between nations and the important role technology 
plays in international relations have been stated as reasons 
for the academic interest in the topic. The desire for the 
transfer of modern technology to underdeveloped countries is 
shared by both government and private interests, but are fraught 
with complications. Fears of disruption of the social or economic 
structure of a developing country , or exploitation of its natural 
resources by the superpowers are widely publicized, but a desire 
for the increased productivity and material wealth seem to be 
overpowering. (Seurat 1979) 
The central problem revolves around the selection of the 
proper types of technology. Purely economic decisions based 
on capital investment and return have met with repeated failures 
in international technological development ventures. (Strasser 
1974) Improved methods for determining theproper level and 
types of technology to fit the developing nation's cultural 
and social needs have been developed, and are being promoted 
by the u. S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the 
United Nations. Of primary importance is the adaptation of 
industrial technology to allow for maximum labor intensity 
and minimum capital investment. For example, a food canning 
plant might be converted from a continuous to a batch processing 
which requires more labor, less capital, and produces at a lower 
per unit cost. The concept of the "industrial profile" was 
developed by SRI economist E . A. Staley to describe the pertinent 
aspects of industrial plants and aid in the selection of the 
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proper types of industrial develop ment to fit indigenous economic 
and social factors. (Bredo 1974) It is the selection and adaptation 
of technology, not just the imposition of it, which determines 
the success of international technology transfer. There are many 
related factors such as national security, arms proliferation, 
"human rights", and balance of payments which complicate the issues. 
(Brede 1974 and Seurat 1979) In a significant way these concerns 
act as a reverse technology transfer. As we push industrial 
technology to the 0 underveloped" nations, we receive in return vast 
amounts of new knowledge and understanding of differing cultures, 
and are forced to develop new management techniques. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I find that I did have a seemingly common preconception about 
the term technology transfer, at least about the technology part. 
Like many of the managers discussed in the literature, I think 
of technology in terms of scientific data being applied to the 
production of goods. Returning to definitions for a moment, 
the root of technology, 11 technique" has two definitions. 
The first is "a number of processes based on scien~ific know-
how used in production 11 , and a second broader one is "a number 
of procedures used to produce something, or to obtain a previously 
determined result". (Seurat 1979) Utilizing the second definition, 
I can broaden my view of technology transfer, particularly as 
it pertains to management, to include innovations in such fields 
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patent policy with respect to unauthorized use of a patent by the 
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I have some problenis accepting the "transfer" side of the term as 
being adequately descriptive. Perhaps something like "Technology Transfer, 
Application and/or Utilization", would better cover the broad range of activities 
being discussed. I don't want to get hung up on definitions because only half 
of my topic was concerned with "what is it ' ", the other half was "what can it 
do for me?". I realize now that I have just been the benefactor of a technology 
transfer. In the introduction I stated th~t I wanted to synthesize a data 
base and determine what it was all about; a transfer of technical knowledge . 
How I will utilize it other than to finish the requirements of another class 
remains to be seen. 
The body of knowledge is huge. I discussed five viewpoints, only 
scratching the surface, and I am sure there are many more. The important 
thing to remember is that we deal with technology transfer every day . I 
only thought that I didn't know what it was. By giving it a name , accurate 
or not, we are able to examine it at different angles and realize it as a 
process which we engage in every day. How well we do it not only determ i nes 
our industrial productivity, but our social adaptation as well. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore in some detail the 
area of patents as a factor in the military procurement process. 
The writer's interest in this subject was aroused, initially at 
least, by what may best be described as ethical objections to the 
practice of military agencies in awarding contracts involving 
intentional or acknowledged infringement of patents issued by the 
Federal Government. Recognition of this willingness of the Department 
of Defense contractin9 officers to authorize, either explicitly 
or by award of a contract which involves use of a production process 
patented by a firm other than the recipient of the award, was 
somewhat startling. 
On the surface such activities seem to represent a blatant 
disregard for the legal rights of patent holders. In the discussion 
that follows it is hoped that this concept will be replaced by 
definition of the proper consideration of patent rights (and in-
fringement) in conducting cost and price analysis in military 
procurements. Background information on the Federal legislation 
and Department of Defense regulations pertaining to patents will 
be presented. Recent initiatives in reforming the Government's 
official patent policy will be examined. Finally, one military 
procurement agnecy's views regarding claims for patent infringement 
will be included in the discussion. 
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PATENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
A patent is defined as a ttgrant by the State or Sovereign 
to a designated person or corporation, of a certain right or 
privilege". (Biesterfeld 1949) Pate n ts for invention have been 
granted at various times throughout history by governments and 
sovereigns. The first system established for the gra~t of patents 
in the modern sense was originated in England. In the American 
colonies, especially in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connect-
icut, there was some provision for granting patents, with the 
earliest patent having been granted in 1646. {Biesterfeld 1949) 
Incorporated in the framing of the Constitution was a pro-
vision authorizing Congress to establish a patent system. 
I, Section 8 reads in part: 
Article 
The Congress shall have the power ... To promote the progress 
of science and useful arts, by secur i ng for limited times 
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries; ... 
According to the English Statute of Monopo1ies, the foundation 
for the United States Patent Law, the grant of patents for devices 
deemed to be within public knowledge was £orbidden, but with an 
exception that the bringing into existence of a new invention by 
a first and true inventor would be recognized by the issuing of 
a patent. (Biesterfeld 1949) This provision, that new and original 
inventions were advantageous to the State and its citizens and 
merited special inducement and reward in the form of a li~itjd 
monopoly, was the Government's official recognition of the need 
for patents. The creation of such monopolies was seen as a con-






by both England and the United States during the Industrial Revolution 
was due in large part to the stimulus provided by a protective 
patent system. Inventors w~re encouraged to risk their time and 
personal wealth in the creation of new machines and products, 
in hopes of realiz~ng person~! r~"ir& dd~ffi~~iiirate witfi i~~ir 
contribution toward the public welfare. 
U. s. Patent Acts 
As stated above the U. s. Constitution empowered Congress 
to secure to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries 
and inventions. Pursuant to this power a series of patent acts 
were passed to provide for the scope of protection envisioned. 
Congress passed the first patent act in 1790 inaugurating the 
grant of patents under federal authority. 
The present patent act, known as the Patent Act of 1952, 
Title 35 of the u. s. Code (1964), provides that: 
Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee 
(owner of the patent) ... of the right to exclude others 
from making, using or selling the invention. (Patent Act of 
1952, 35 u.s.c. (1964)) 
The law also provides that: 
... whoever without authority makes, uses, or sells any 
patented invention within the United States during the 
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
(Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. (1964)) 
Patent infringement, then, may be defined as the unauthorized 
making, using, or selling of the patented invention, with the 
wrongdoing carried out by one who violates the patent. 
A patent is viewed as having the same attributes as personal 
property with the patent owner possessing clear property rights 
in his patent. In addition, patent infringement is described 
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as the invasion of this property right, and is essentially a 
tort. In strict statutory terms, within the various classes of 
invention, a patented process may be infringed only by tne practice 
or carrying out of the claimed steps in the process. On the other 
hand, machines, articles, and compositions of matter are said to 
be infringed by making, manufacturing, using or selling the pat-
ented item specifically covered. (Peters 1967) 
Patents grant to an inventor the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling his invention for a period of seventeen 
years. The exclusion right extends throughout the United States 
and its territories. The scope of discussion contained in this 
paper is concerned only with "utility" patents covering an article 
or process. 
Patent Considera ,tions in Government Contracts 
The above discussion provides the legislative background for 
the government's authority to issue patents. When the s:i tua tion • 
involves the government as one of the parties in a. cont?::act, howeve1r,. 
several additional key statutes relating to patents a•nd! technica •l 
data must also be considered: (Black 1978) 
1. Title 10 of the u. s. Code provides: 
a. The u. S. Court of Claims has j uris d.tct ·ion ' in su.its 
brought against the United States for patent infr±ngement+ 
b. The Depa -rtment of Defense is a-uthoriZ'.ed . to use 
appropriated ' funds for the acquisition of copyrig;hts, 
pa ·tents, and · applications for patents, f ·or the.i.r 
licensing, or for the settlement of claim ·s of · their 
infringement. (emphasis added) 
2. Title 22 of the U. S. Code provides: 





Disarmament Agency, can make all patents developed through 
the use of appropriated funds available to the general 
public. 
b. The Secretaries of individual military agencies must 
protect the patent rights of all citizens in the sale of 
surplus material. 
3. Title 28 of the U. s. Code provides that the owner of any 
invention covered by au. s. patent has the right of reasonable 
compensation only in an action brought against the U. S. 
Government in the Court of Claims where the patent has been 
infringed through the authorization or consent of the Govern-
ment. 
4. Title 42 of the u. s . Code provides that the Secretary of 
any Defense Department, the Secretary of the Department of 
Energy, and the chief officer of any other agency or unit 
officially designated as a "defense agency" and the Secretary 
of Commerce can promulgate separate rules, regulations and 
policy guidance regarding patents and patent applications. 
The authority granted to DoD to use appropriated funds for the 
settlement of claims of patent infringement amply illustrates 
the point that the military agencies do, in fact, become involved 
in such cases through the performance of their procurement functions. 
The right to "reasonable compensation only" accorded the patent 
0 holder who brings suit against the U. S. Government is again a 
recognition of that fact. 
Unauthorized Patent Use by the Government 
The judicial remedy available to a patent holder under Title 
28 of the U.S. Code refers to unauthorized use of a patented in-
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vention by the Government or by Government contractors. (Peters 
1967) Section 1948, paragraph one reads in part: 
Whenever an invention ... covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States 
without license of the owner thereof or l~awfi~l ri~ht' .to · ose 
or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by 
action against the United States in the Court of Claims 
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation 
for such use and manufacture. 
The second paragraph continues: 
for the purpose (of the first paragraph) of this section .. • 
use or manufacture for the United States is the use or 
manufacture of an invention ... covered by a patent of the 
United States by a contractor or a subcontractor ... for the 
Government and with the authorization or consent of the 
Government ... 
It is important to note that the Government and its contracto~s 
may not be prohibited from the use of a patented invention. By 
limiting a patent owner's remedies to those specified above, 
Title 28 subjects the patent(s) involved to compulsory licensing 
in favor of the United States Government. (Peters 1967) Consideration 
of the effect on contractor performance of unauthori z ed patent use 
is therefore not required of the contracti n g officer whose antic-
ipated c ontract award may eventually lead to such a claim by a 
patent owner. More specifically, in developing his cost analysis, 
t he principal contracting officer need not analyze the impact 
on final performance costs o f a break in production forced by a 
patent owner requesting an injunction against continued work by 
the prime contractor or a subcontractor. 
Eminent Domain 
The judicial foundation of the right to i mmunity from a patent 






may best be summarized as follows: 
... the right granted the Government under 28 u.s.c. 1948 
is one of eminent domain, i.e., Congress has taken away the 
patent owner's right of injunctive relief, providing instead 
a right of reasonable and entire compensation for the taking. 
It may be helpful to point out that the remedy available 
to a patent owner .•. is for unauthorized use by or for 
the Government of a patented invention, and not for patent 
infringement. (Peters 1967) 
The distinction between "unauthorized use" on the part of the 
Government and "patent infringement" by private parties is an 
important one. The patent owner's remedy in the former case is 
limited to "reasonable and entire compensation", while in the 
latter instance the possible remedies may include a combination 
of injunction, damages, courts costs, and attorney fees. 
The reason for this difference lies in the government's vested 
right to use the patented invention (for the common good), while, 
in the case of private parties, no right to use the patented invention 
of another exists without a licensing agreement. (Peters 1967) 
DoD PATENT REGULATIONS 
In view of the foregoing discussion of the Government's rights 
regarding unauthorized use of patents, some evidence of the 
recognition of this factor in DoD procurements is required . The 
following overview of patent clauses to be included in all DoD 
contracts follows the format in Section 9 of the Defense Acquisition 
Regulation (DAR). 
Authorization and Consent 
The concept of authorization and consent is used to prevent 
any interruption of contractor performance in government work. 
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In contracts for supplies and services the following clause 
(unedited) is inserted : 
The Government hereby gives its autho r ization and consent 
(without prejudice to any rights of indemnification) for 
all use and manufacture, in the performance of this contract 
or any part hereof or any amendment hereto or any subcontract 
hereunder (including any lower-tier subcontract), of any 
invention described in and covered by a patent of the 
United States . . . the use of which necessarily results from 
compliance by the Contractor or the using subcontractor 
with (a) specifications .. . or (b) specific written instructions 
given by the Contracting Officer directing the manner of 0 
performance. The entire liability to the Government for 
infringement ... shall be determined solely by the provisions 
of the indemnity clauses . . . and the Government assumes liability 
for all other infringement to the extent of the authorization 
and co n sent herein granted. ( DAR 9 - 104) 
The gover n ment does not assume full responsibility for all liability 
for all possible damages due the patent owner . Such an agreem~nt 
to indemnify the contractor against liability for a patent infringe~ 
ment is expressly prohibited. 
Patent Indemnification of the Government by the Contractor 
Patent indemnity clauses are used to provide for reimbursing 
the Government for patent infringement liability in formally adver-
tised contracts in excess of $10,000 for supplies or construction . 
The basis for determining if an indemnity clause is required in-
volves the nature of the supplies ; that is, whether they are normally 
sold or offered for sale to the general public (with minor mod-
ifications). (DAR 9-103) If that is the case, infringement of 
a patent becomes the sole responsibility of the contractor with 
regard to damages due the patent owner. The government is respon-
sible for notifying the contractor of any suit filed by the patent 
owner, and permitting the contractor sufficient opportunity to 





The reasoning behind this requirement closely parallels the 
criteria used in judging if a contractor's claim for exemption 
from the requirement to furnish cost or pricing data for an item 
whose price is (or is based on) an established catalog price. 
(ASPM no. 1 1975) If the construction performed or supplies fur-
nished under the contract are sold (or have been sold) to the 
general public, then the government is buying what is essentially 
a commercial product. Infringement of a patent in the performance 
of a contract for such a product then is due entirely to the 
contractor's own actions for which he is properly liable. 
Notice and Assistance 
The contractor is required to notify the Government of all 
claims for patent infringement resulting from performance of a 
Government contract. (DAR 9-104) In addition, the contractor 
must assist the Government by providing evidence and information 
in his possession, in connection with any suit or claim of alleged 
patent or copy right infringement made against the Government. 
This requirement applies to all contracts over $10,000 for supplies, 
services, research and development, or experimental work, and 
construction. 
Administrative Claims 
A claim for compensation against the United States by reason 
of patent infringement under any of the applicable statutes must 
be submitted in writing to and received by a department, agency, 
organization, office or field establishment within the Department 
of Defense. Claims generally should include the following data: 
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(DAR 9-404) 
1. An allegation of infringement; 
2. A request for comp•nsation, either expressed or implied: 
3. A citation of the patent(s) alleged to be infringed; 
4. Designation of the alleged infringing item or process 
sufficient to permit identification; 
5. Designation of a minimum of one claim for each patent 
allegedly infringed; 
6. Or, in lieu of items 4 and 5 above, certification that 
an attempt was made by the claimant to determine the item or 
process which is alleged to infringe, but that he was unable 
to do so. Reasons must be provided establishing the basis 
for his belief that his patent(s) is being infringed. 
Any Department which receives an allegation of patent infringement 
must acknowledge the claim and supply copies of the same to other 
interested Departments . In the case of a Navy contract, the Office 
of Naval Research has overall authority for processing administrative 
claims of alleged patent infringement. In addition, major systems 
commands also have a patent counsel with limited authority to 
settle administrative claims up to $5 million in value. (NAVAIRSYSCOM) 
On the average the Navy has approximately sixty adminstrative 
claims in process. When notified of receipt of a patent infringement 
claim, the major systems commands will normally assume responsibility 
for final settlement of the claim from the claimant~ Naval Air 
Systems Command, by virtue of the highly technical nature of its 
procurements, is involved with one-half of the total number of 
claims of alleged patent infringement filed against the Department 
of the Navy. The majority of claims are instituted by firms in 
the electronics industry, due primarily to the competitive nature 






concentrated use of patent protection for the developing technology. 
The majority of patent infringement claims are the result of 
what may best be described as insufficient patent coverage investi-
gation on the part of contractors or subcontractors performing 
work under NAVAIR contracts. Claims generally arise because a 
contractor either knows of no patent on the item or process, or 
fails to recognize t he possibility that patent coverage may be 
involved. 
The dollar value of compensation requested in an alleged 
patent infringement claim is dependent on the size of the procure-
ment involved. In processing each claim, the patent counsel applies 
the concept of "reasonable compensation" to determine the value 
of the settlement to be offered. The average settlement is 
approximately $100,000. The willingness of the claimant to aoo~pt 
administrative settlement reflects the uncertainty of and great 
expense involved with the judicial process of patent infringement 
suit in the Court of Claims. such legal action routinely requires 
more than two years from initiation of the suit to first hearing 
by the court. A final ruling will often not be rendered for many 
years; therefore, claims handled in this way involve a large in-
vestment in legal fees. In the end, a claimant :' s , decision ·: 'ho sue 
the government must include an assessment of the dollar value of the 
compensation claimed and the likelihood that the claim will he 
upheld by the Court. A 1978 Court of Claims decision in favor 
of the Auto-Gyro Company of America resulted in an award of $14 
million signifying the size of the reward which may accrue to the 
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successful patent owner. That suit was in litigation for many 
years, and the size of damages awarded to the claimant included 
more than $8 million as compensation for the length of time 
involved. Currently, twenty suits alleging patent infringement 
remain pending in the Court of Claims. 
ROYALTY COSTS 
Royalties are defined as "any costs or charges in the nature 
of royalties, license fees, patent or license amortization costs, 
orttie · like, for the use of or rights in patents or patent applications". 
(ASPM no.l 1975) The Armed Services Procurement Regulation Manual 
for Contract Pricing on DD Form 633, Contract Pricing Proposal, 
describes the type of information required in a contractor's 
estimate of royalty costs in a negotiated procurement: (ASPM no. 1 
1975) 
If the total cost entered here is in excess of $250, provide 
... the following information on each separate item of royalty 
or license fee; name and address of licensor; date of license 
agreement; patent numbers, or other basis on which the royalty 
is payable; brief description, including any part or model 
numbers of each contract item or component on which · the 
royalty is payable; percentage or dollar rate of royalty per 
unit; unit price of contract item; number of units; and total 
dollar amount of royalties. In addition, if specifically 
requested by the contracting officer, a copy of the current 
license agreement and identification of applicable claims 
of specific patents shall be provided. 
Royalty payments normally result from license agreements for the 
use of patented products or man u facturing processes. The license 
agreement must explicitly describe the item(s) it covers on the 
contract under negotiation. If the license agreement is not 
sufficiently definitive, the above information in the footnote 






Evaluating Royalty Costs 
Royalty information is required to be submitted only in 
negotiated procurements. The cost(s) of patent use is thus 
involved in the complete analysis of all contract costs. Eval-
uation of these items by the contracting officer requires a 
determination that the royalties are not excessive, improper, 
or inconsistent with any rights the Government may already own 
or has acquired in particular inventions, patents, or patent 
applications. The contracting officer is also required to for-
ward all royalty information to the patent office within the 
procuring agency. That office advises the contracting officer 
of the appropriate action to take. 
Patents Held by the Government 
The above stipulation that royalty determinations be made 
by the office (or legal counsel) responsible for patent affairs 
within the agency is closely related to the government's vested 
interest in research and development efforts. 
on Government Procurement stated in 1972: 
The Commission 
The Government invests some $15 billion per year in research 
and development programs. A great deal of this is carried 
on under contracts or grants. During the course of such 
programs, some 9,000 inventions per year are made by con-
tractors or grantees. This activity has necessitated the 
development of policies respecting the disposition of 
rights in such inventions. Should the Government take 
all rights to an invention arising under its contracts? 
(Report of the Commission on Government Procurement 1972) 
This question illustrates the fact that the Government, in the 
course of its yearly investment in R&D work, avails itself 
of the opportunity to patent thousands of new inventions. 
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This knowledge is the focal point upon which most controversy 
regarding Federal patent policy reform centers. 
Whether the Government should exercise its patent rights 
on inventions discovered in the course of contract performance 
is not, however, within the scope of this paper to consider. 
It is presented to illustrate the point that examination of 
proposed royalty costs requires careful analysis of license 
agreements to ensure that the Government does not own the patent 
rights concerned. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of the Government in procurement is to acquire 
a quality product, in the time allowed, for a fair and reasonable 
price. 
The objective of the exercise of the Government's power 
to issue patents is to encourage invention and innovation by 
granting exclusive rights to the inventor. In today's industrial 
environment technological advancement may be considered a prereq-
uisite for maintaining a firm's competitive position in the 
market. Patent coverage can provide protection for valuable 
breakthroughs in any industry. 
Are the two above-mentioned objectives mutually exclusive? 
In the day-to-day process of acquiring goods and services from 
private industry, the Government must face this question. 
Resolution of the conflict lies at the basis of both activities: 
each is carried out to promote the public welfare. Benefits 






In both situations, the country as a whole is rewarded. 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, patent infringe-
ment in Government contracts is the area of study. The Federal 
statutes regarding patent infringement, or what is more approp-
riately described as unauthorized use of a patent by the Govern-
ment, are most equitable in protecting the rights of the patent 
owner. The primary thrust of the statutes with respect to 
Government contracts is to avoid any injunctive recourse that 
would interfere with contractor performance. Adequate recourse 
in the form of administrative claims or judicial proceedings via 
the Court of Claims is available to patent owners alleging 
infringement. 
Relating patent infringement as a cost element to be con-
sidered in contract pricing and negotiation is, at best, an im-
possible task. The ability of military agencies to settle patent 
infringement cases through administrative claims affects 
appropriated funds within the agency, but in no way impacts on 
the contract involved. The contracting officer's sole concern 
with patents is royalty costs. As was shown, the responsibility 
for this evaluation has been delegated to the legal departments. 
One recommendation, that of extending authority to settle 
administrative claims of patent infringement to all Government 
agencies, is presented. This view was profered by the Commission 
on Government Procurement in 1972, but has not yet been enacted 
into legislation. The utility of the authority is fully recog-
nized as providing a timely, low cost method for patent owners 
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to recover alleged damages against the Government. Its extension 
to other than military agencies is worthy of renewed attention 
in Congress. 
Last, it is highly recommended that students who display 
dissatisfaction with the Government's unauthorized use of 
patents be provided a copy of this paper in hopes of assuaging 
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In November, 1970, a relatively unknown state senator and 
erstwhile peanut farmer from southern Georgia, who had been 
recently elected to the governorship of that sta~e on a plat-
form that promised to reorganize Georgia's executive branch 
and make state government more efficient, read an article in 
the Harvard Business Review by Peter Phyrr, the Manager, Staff 
Control at Texas Instruments Corporation in Dallas Texas. 
The article, titled "Zero-Base Budgeting", described a budgeting 
procedure based on cost/benefit techniques that enabled TI 
to more effectively allocate limited resources to operations 
of an "optional or discretionary character". (Phyrr 1970) 
Impressed by the soundness of the techniques described in 
the article, the governor hired Mr. Phyrr as a consultant to the 
state and implemented ZBB in the state budgetary development 
procedures. Six years later, this relatively unknown southern 
governor had been elected President of the United States. 
That former governor and President-elect, James Earl Carter, 
announced that "Immediately after my inauguration, I will 
require zero-base budgeting for all federal departments, bureaus, 
and boards by executive order". (Carter 1977) Based on what 
he perceived as the successful implementation of zero-base budgeting 
in Georgia, a process that "resulted in a fifty percent reduction 
in administrative costs", he had decided to revamp the method by 
which the Federal budget was prepared. (Carter 1977) 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. The first purpose 
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is to examine the theory and practices of zero-base budgeting. 
The second purpose is to review how successful this technique 
was when it was implemented on the federal level. 
WHAT I S ZBB? 
Zero-base budgeting has been defined as "an operating, 
planning and budge t ing process which req u ires each manager 
to justify his entire budge~ from scratch (hence zero-base) 
and shifts the burden of proof to each manager to justify why 
he should spend any money at a ll . Th i s approach requires tha t 
all activities be identifed in 'decis i on packages' which wil l 
be evaluaqed b y systematic analysis a n d ranked in order of 
importance~ :- (Phyrr 1972) 
In orde r to understand ZBB and why it evolved, it is 
necessary t o understand the traditional planning and budgeting 
approach; i.e., its underlying assumptions and shortcomings. 
Budgeting in the traditional manner essentially calls for 
three steps : 
1. Taking the last year's spending level, and allowing 
for inflation, extrapolate that figure into next year's budget. 
2. Increment that trended level for wage and salary in-
creases as well as increases in the cost of required materials 
and services. 
3 . Further incr e ment that trended spending level to allow 
for new projects and programs. "Such requests often represent 







Inherent in the traditional approach are several under-
lying assumptions. Firs~, it is assumed that all of the activities 
that were included in the last year's spending level were essen-
tial to achieving the on-going objectives of the organization. 
It also assumes that those objectives are still applicable and 
are more urgent than newly requested programs. Furthermore, 
it assumes that the activities funded last year are the most 
cost-effective and efficient way to accomplish the organization's 
objectives. Last, the traditional method of budgeting assumes 
that the activities will continue to be cost-effective and 
necessary in the coming year, thus requiring increases only for 
labor and materials inflation. As Cheek points out, "unless 
all of these assumptions are true - and it is highly unlikely 
thau they are - our simplistic extrapolation has generated a 
grossly inflated budget". (Cheek 1977) 
The results of the traditional approach are that when the 
consolidated figures are presented to top management for review, 
the figures are presented in a way as to tell top management 
exactly how much they are spending, but very little about what 
they are getting for the money. Further, while knowing how 
much is being spent for a particular activity, there is no way 
of deriving from the budget if this expenditure is the best 
way to achieve the organizational objectives. Since, in any 
organization, there is a finite limit to how much money is 
available, it is the responsibility of top management to allo-
cate the limited resources in the most effective manner. 
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Yet, in the traditional bud .get, there is al .most nqne of the 
information required to make a rational deoi~ion oq where to 
reduce or eliminate ineffective programs. 
While ZBB is a relat~vely recent addition to management 
techniques, the concept is not entirelr new. In the ~~~~Y 
sixties, the U. S. Department of Agriculture ~egan qsin~ a 
"ground-up" budgeting technique which incl~ded a re-evaluation 0 
of all the DeEartment's progr~ms annually. Later, 4uriqg the 
Johnson Administration, the PPB~ (Pianning~Progra~ming-B~dg~ting 
System) was introduced. It was a syste~ that trie4 to ~ssign 
costs to specific programs versus the ~ssignment of costs to 
an agency or department. It attempted to ~peoify b~sic objectiv.es 
in each major area of act~vity and int~od~q~q cost/benefit 
(results) analysis as~ means of just~~i~~tlon for fuq~~ng. 
"In sum, PPBS was a p~ogram~oriented ~eohql,qu~ with a loqg~r~nge 
horizon that demanded cost justificatiqn of se~eral alternat~ve 
a~~rQaches against an established strateg~c need. ~t~ p~~~~ry 
thrust was ~o~ai::q p¼anning, not budge\in~. But wh~~e proper~y 
oqnducted, an operati11g budget was its natu _ral fal:iout." 
(Cheek 1977) 
ZBB, on the other hand, is prim•ri~y direct~d at the budget~~y 
proc~ss. The three b~sic elements of zero-base budget~ng are: 
l,. Iden~j,fy the organization structuz:e . ,, ''dec.i,,sj,on uni,ts", 
~nd objectives. 
2. Develop "decis _ion pack~ges". 
~- Rank the various "dec~sion packages"~~ the qext highe~ 





In the final analysis, zero-base budgeting is a management 
information system that "provides management with an operating 
tool to evaluate and allocate its resources effectively". 
(Phyrr 1970) 
IDENTIFY THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, "DECISION UNITS" AND 
OBJECTIVES 
In this area ZBB "borrows" a number of concepts that evolved 
out of Management by Objectives. The company, at the top manage-
ment level, must first decide what are the broad, long-range 
goals of the organization. These broad goals are then made 
known to the lower level managers whose task it is to plan 
their operations in such a manner as to most effectively and 
efficiently achieve the goals. In the development of the 
objectives, which must be specific, measurable and time-oriented, 
ZBB like MBO, calls for a participatory management system where 
the various levels of management decide together what the 
objectives will be. While in the business community there is 
some disagreement as to how much top management should be in-
volved in the setting of specific objectives, the Federal 
Government is fairly explicit. "Congress is responsible for 
setting of broad goals, or missions, by statute. Long range 
goals in support of these missions are established by the planning 
process of the various agencies and departments. These long range 
goals are then identified to the lower level managers for in-
corporation into specific objectives". (Sarant 1978) Further-
more, as objectives are identified, managers must "simultaneously 
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determine the key indicators by which efficiency and eff~ctive 
performance are to be measured". (Sarant 1978) 
A decision unit is the organizational entity which wil l 
be.responsible for the preparation of budge~ requests. Selection 
of these units is based on the relationship of that entity 
to the entire organization. In order to avoid an exc~ssive 
amount of time and paperwork, two often-voiced criticisms of 
ZBB, two important factors must be consideredi 
l. The units must not be so low in the o~gaqization a~ 
to preclude meaningful review or analysts. 
2. The level decided upon for initiation of the budgetary 
process must be such that the managers of these units must be 
able to make "significant decisions on the amount of spending 
and scope, direction, and quality of work to be performeO". 
{0MB Bulletin 1977) 
The reasons for these guideline$ are o~vioqs. ~he simplest 
way to establish the decision unit is to do SQ at th~ ~oat 
center level , which is what Phyrr did at Te~qij Jnstr~ment~. 
However, in a large organization such ~s Gen~~~l Mqtqr~, tqere 
can be literally thousands of cost centers which ~re identifiable, 
Further, the managers of these cost centers may h~9e 11tttl~'dr 
no control over the costs incurred. For example, tbe mapqg~r 
responsible for deciding whether to include expep~e~ incurr~4 
as a result of warranty work done on a Gene~al ~ptors ~~tom9bile 
in Iowa has no control on the warranty program as defin~d by GM, 
Since he has no control, it would be senseiesij to hoia him 






Also, if the decision units are at too low a level, the 
time and effort put into_ the preparation and evaluation of the 
decision package may be such as to make the entire process too 
cumbersome and impractical to use in developing the budget. 
DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION PACKAGES 
Phyrr has defined two basic types of decision packages. 
One is the "mutually exclusive package which identifies alterna-
tive means for performing the same function". (Phyrr 1970) 
The best alternative is chosen and the other packages are dis-
carded. The other type of package is the "Incremental package 
which reflects different levels of effort that may be expended 
on a specific function. One package, the *base package' may 
establish a minimum level of activity and the others identify 
higher activity or cost levels". (Phyrr 1970) 
To aid the manager in determining the requirements or 
objectives, top management should issue a formalized set of 
assumptions as to planned activity levels, projected wage/ 
salary increases, etc. In addition to providing the manager 
with a basis for estimating funding requirements, Phyrr points 
out three other advantages for the formalized assumptions: 
1. It will correct inaccurate assumptions or misunderstandings 
among lower level management. 
2. It will provide a focal point for reviewing and revising 
assumptions and reduce the number of revisions . 
3. It helps everyone keep track of the revisions to the 
list of assumptions and changes in activity levels and the 
costs that these revisions entail. 
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Eac h d ecision pa c kage identifies the reasons for performing 
an activity , the cons e 1uence~ of not performing the activity, 
measures of performa n ce, alternative ways to accomplish the 
activity , and the cos t s associated with each of the alternatives. 
"The key to the zero-base budgeting process lies in the ident-
i fication and evalua t ion of alternatives for each activity. 
(A ustin 19 77) 
The first step in developing a decision package is to decide 
whether t h e activity performed by the decision unit will be 
contin u ed, eliminated , or changed and what effect that decision 
will have on the ac c ompl i s hme n t of the organization's objectives. 
' 
Once t hat decision has been made, the next step i s to develop 
alternative means to a c hieve the desired result. Then it must 
be determ i ned at what level below which the result can not be 
accomplished, i.e . establish the "zero-base" of the activity. 
Once the minimum level has ·been established, the manager 
then develops packages that show how a greater level of expend-
iture provides greater amounts of the desired results that 
achieve the desired objective. 
THE RANKING PROCESS 
In theory, once the decision unit managers have developed 
their decision packages , one ranking of all of the packages 
could be performed by top management . However, as Phyrr points 
out this single ranking would impose a "ponderous, if not 
impossible t ask on top mana g ement". (Phyrr 1970) On the other 
hand, allowing ranking only at the decision unit level would 






possible trade-offs and reprioritization. 
To control the volume of packages that each consolidation 
level of management must r~view, Phyrr recommends setting "cut-
off" levels. At each level, management would review the ranked 
packages from the next lowest level, and merely skim the top 
rated packages until the required expenditure for these packages 
reached a predetermined percentage of the previous year's ex-
penditures. For example, at the top level of consolidation, 
the cut-off may be at eighty percent of last year's budget for 
reasonableness. The remaining twenty percent will then be 
"seriously scrutinized and rank the remaining low ranked and 
more discretionary packages into a consolidated package to be 
passed to the top". (Phyrr 1970) At each lower level a lower 
cut-off level would be established so that a thorough review 
of all packages would occur at some level. 
The initial ranking should occur at the decision unit level 
where the manager evaluates the relative importance of his own 
packages for the various activities for which he is responsible. 
Then the manager at the next level up the chain-of-command 
reviews the rankings of all of the packages from all of the 
decision unit managers who are responsible to him, and produces 
a consolidated ranking of all the packages for presentation to 
the next higher level. 
Phyrr recommends that the consolidation process be done by 
a committee made up of the higher level manager and all sub-
ordinate managers whereby they vote on the relative priorities. 
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This depe n ds on two things: First, it assumes that the higher 
level manager is willing to give up some of his control, and 
secondly, that all of the individuals will vote rationally 
and no t make deals to ensure funding for their "pet" projects. 
As Austin points out, ranking involves arranging the packages 
in priority order on the basis of cost/benefit analysis or 
subjective evaluation. "The ZBB process does not require the 
complete quantification of all costs and benefits. It gets 
away from th i s by using an ordinal ranking process." (Austin 1977) 
All that is needed to be known is that package "A" is better 
than package "B", not that "A" is four times better than "B" . 
BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF ZBB 
Prop o nents of ZBB claim the process benefits the organization 
in several ways. First it links results with allocations. 
ZBB forces a closer examination of assumptions related to allo-
cation. ZBB forces the examination because it requires specific 
results to be stipulated before allocation is permitted. 
ZBB also fosters committment and creativity because it re-
quires the manager to state what he will achieve, and what 
resources he will need to achieve it. As Austin points out, 
the manager "is not likely to forget that he developed the 
objectives and he won the resources to achieve them as he works 
towards the results he said he could attain". (Austin 1977) 
ZBB also improves the feedback on decisions. In seeing 
how their packages were ranked, the managers gain an insight 






Proponents also claim that ZBB improves the quality of 
planning in that it gives managers a better understanding of 
the goals of the organization and how to apply the budget 
accordingly, as well as permitting the shifting of resources 
to higher benefit options. 
Furthermore, ZBB helps the organizing function by clarifying 
and defining resource responsibility. It eliminates duplication 
of efforts and overlapping responsibility and authority. It is 
also useful in developing and training managers by helping 
managers to "better understand their jobs and how their roles 
can help accomplish organizational goals", as well as giving 
managers a better understanding of budget and planning processes 
and increased involvement of personnel at the activity level. 
(Austin 1977) 
The detractors claim that ZBB requires a lot of time, money, 
and paperwork to produce a budget that may not meet the desired 
objectives. 
A danger in installing a zero-base budgeting process is that 
"it implies that the budgeting techniques being replaced are 
inadequate". (Brown and Suver 1977) It implies that the man-
agers have not done enough evaluation and planning in the past. 
This implication might well lead to resentment by the managers 
toward the ZBB system being installed, and to attempts to thwart 
the system. 
Critics also contend that ZBB has not significantly effected 
the allocation of funds. In a survey of the department heads and 
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budget analysts in the state of Georgia by Georges. ·Minmer 
and Roger H. Hermanson, done in 1972 after ZBB had been installed, 
only seven percent of those surveyed indicated that even a 
slight shifting of financial resources had occurred. The early 
U. s. Department of Agriculture attempt mentioned previously 
resulted only in "identifying an excess expenditure for files, 
and a $10,000 reduction (out of a multibillion dollar budget} 
in an obsolete research program". (Brown and Suver 1977) 
Furthermore, the single most low ranked program was the subsidy 
to the 4-H program. Yet, due to a fear of possible political 
reaction, the program was fully funded. 
Another criticism offered is in the ranking process. In 
addition to the burden of reviewing thousands of decision pack-
ages, the use of the cutoff percentages allows lower level man-
agers to hide inefficiencies, make trade-offs with other managers 
to protect pet projects, and "label featherbedding items as 
essential" in order to avoid higher level scrutiny. (B"rown and 
Suver 1977) This, of course, defeats the entire purpos .e of the 
system. 
In the final analysis, there has not been a great deal of 
empirical evidence to support either the proponents or critics 
of ZBB. In a survey of 481 enterprises that have either been 
using zero-base budgeting techniques, or has attended ZBB sem-
inars conducted by the American Management Association, several 
conclusions can be drawn. Of the respondents who had implemented 






1. To better allocate resources. 
2 • To improve decision making. 
3. To facilitate-planning. 
4. To reduce costs/personnel. 
5. To reorganize the company. 
Ninety-four percent of the respondents reported that their 
objectives were fully to fairly well satisfied; only six percent 
reported that they were poorly or not achieved at all. The 
objectives that were best achieved were to facilitate planning, 
to improve decision making, and to better allocate resources. 
On the other hand, the survey conducted by Minmer and Her-
manson in Georgia, showed that only seven percent of the respon-
dents felt that the system effected the allocation of resources. 
Furthermore, seventy-seven percent felt the quality of management 
information received, used to facilitate planning, and improve 
decision making, either remained the same as before or only 
slightly improved. 
While some of the contradictions may be explained by the fact 
that one survey was of businesses and the other of a government, 
and that the survey of Georgia State Officials was related to 
only one installation whereas Austin's survey encompassed many 
different adaptations, I believe that it is simply too soon to 
make a final judgement and that further empirical research is 
necessary before drawing any conclusions. 
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ZBB AND THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 
True to his pre-inauguration promise, on February 14, 1977, 
President Carter issued a memorandum to t h e heads of all exec-
utive departments and agencies t h at o r dered each agency and 
department to "develop a zero-base system within your agency 
in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Office of 
Management and Budget. The Fiscal Year 1979 budget will be 
prepared using this system" . (Carter 1977) Th i s memorandum 
was followed by 0MB Bulletin 7 7-9, issued on April 19, 1977, 
which gave detailed instrucitons on how to implement this new 
process. Additionally, a year earlier, in February, 1976, 
Senator Edmund Muskie , and others i ~ntroduced the "Government 
Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976 u which would have made 
zero-base budgeting mandatory for all federal agencies as well 
as establish a program of quadrennial review, and evaluation of 
all federal programs by Congress to determine if the merits and 
results of a program warranted its continuation. 
How well did ZBB work in controlling the costs and improving 
the e~ficiency of the Federal Government? 
The initial reaction to the program was an outcry from the 
various agencies that bemoaned the inordinate amounts of time 
and paperwork required in accumulating the necessary cost data 
and preparing decision packages. Further, as Allen Schick 
pointed out in an article that reviewed the first year under 
ZBB, "No matter how thoroughly the program managers scoured their 
operatiQns for savings, the year to year changes in the budget 






non-budgetary actions. With ZBB upwards of seventy-five percent 
of the budget will continue to be uncontrollable under law. 
Upwards of ninety-five percent will continue to be defacto 
uncontrollable". (Schick 1978) By this, he means that most 
of the costs are incurred as a result of legislative action, 
and to curtail costs would require the repeal of the legislation. 
The problem with this as Congress is now learning under "Reagonomic~" 
is that it may not be in their best political interest to cut 
a program that is beloved by their constituents regardless of 
its ranking among the decision packages. 
By one measure, ZBB was a success. The system was installed 
and produced a budget on time: A budget that outwardly adhered 
to the guidelines presented by 0MB. Schick claims that this 
occurred because ''it did not really change the rules by which 
budgetary decisions are made. It changed the terminology, but 
little more". (Schick 1978) Agency after agency accomodated ZBB 
to its existing budgetary framework. If it had a program 
oriented budget, it selected programs as decision units. If 
its budget was still organizationally oriented, the organization 
became the decision unit. 
0MB guidelines also caused the decision packages to be almost 
devoid of any real decisional use by limiting them to two pages 
per package, plus supplemental material in order to avoid the 
predicted paperwork deluge. This two page lim i t, however, 
"signalled agencies that they didn't have to stuff their pack-
ages with analytical material" . (Schick 1978) 
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Also to help prevent the possibility of being overwhelmed 
by thousands of individual decision packages, 0MB permitted 
agencies to consolidate decision packages that obliterated 
program identities and priorities of lower level managers . 
In doing so, 0MB violated the basic concept of managerial 
involvement and committment in the budgetary process . 
As a result, "the first president to promise a zero-base 
budget delivered the most incremental financial statement 
since Wildavsky cannonized that form of budget-making more 
than a dozen years ago". (Schick 1978) All but two percent 
of the forty billion dollars of increased spending was due 
to inflation and workload increases, and there was not one 
single major program that was significantly reduced or elimi-
nated. 
While the literature regarding Carter's attempt to imple-
ment ZBB in the federal budgetary process stops after the first 
budget, some conclusions can be reached. Succeeding budgets 
continued to increase without a notable reduction in established 
programs. After the initial uproar, very little has been said 
about the attempt to implement ZBB. Many of the hoped for 
benefits were lost in the attempt to adapt zero-base budgeting 
to an organization of almost uncontrollable proportions . The 
Muskie bill requiring zero-base budgeting in the federal govern~ 
ment failed to gain the approval of Congress, perhaps due to the 
recognition of the political realities by his colleagues. As 
Robert Anthony points out, although zero-base budgeting as imple-






the good points of ZBB are not new, budgeting people in the 
federal government should incorporate the good points of ZBB 
in order to improve the financial controls over government 
spending. (Austin 1977) 
As to the final fate of ZBB in the federal government, 
although the phrase has passed out of usage, there are some 
benefits to be derived from the utilization of the ZBB concepts 
in making government more effective and efficient. 
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Captain P. M. Ace has some problems. As the Project Manager 
for development and introduction of a new shipboard weapons 
control system, he has seen this complex program through most 
of the major hurdles in the acquisition process. Now in the 
full-scale development phase, he has been confronted with 
continual schedule slippages. There has been no single major 
delay, but the number of smaller slips are starting to add up. 
The competitive operational evaluation between the two alternative 
designs is scheduled to end in less than six months. This date 
appears to be unattainable at this point, and his current task 
is to prepare the necessary reports to his superiors informing 
them of the anticipated schedule slippage. 
In briefings and strategy meetings with his acquisition team 
and two weapon system contractors, Captain Ace has become aware 
of a single thread in each of the schedule delay situations -
~oftware modifications. A competent technician, Captain Ace is 
aware that both systems depend in large part on a complex computer 
program for their hardware coordination and performance inter-
facing. The contractors are depending on the system software 
to provide the hands-off detection and tracking and assignment 
of various weapons systems. Both software sydtems also include 
frequent operator prompting, numerous system alerts, self-diag-
nostic, and degraded capacity routines which were designed to 
meet the required operational simplicity and reliability standards 
specified. 
Captain Ace also has on his desk a recent letter from the 
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in-service monitor of the systems' software documentation and 
maintainability. The letter reported a significant downturn in 
performance in the documentation area, apparently due to the 
spate o f software modifications made under schedule pressure. 
An i mportant acquisition project was now seriously ill, 
a nd Captai n Ace was of the opinion that the disease might prove 
fata l . 
Captain Ace's project is suffering from symptoms of what 
has been called a software crisis. This crisis, first identified 
formally in 1973, involves the growing disparity between the 
rapid pace of hardware design refinement and production tech-
nology. ( Boehm 1973) Also included in this is the stagnated 
level of software production technology. Computer hardware 
c o s t and size have steadi l y decreased in the past twenty-five 
years. "The unit cost of memory and storage has been reduced 
at a compounded annual rate o f 40%" over tha t period. (Jensen 
and Tonies 1979) Computing devices which filled entire floors 
of users' work space can now be replaced with desk top units 
of equal capacity. In addition to the replacement of older 
equipment, the hardware explosion has brought computers within 
reach of an incredibly d i verse market of new, first time users. 
Applications as awesome as space exp l oration and as mundane as 
control of home washing machines now utilize the products of 
today's hardware technology. 
For the weapon system designer, an en ti re new level of 
sophistication in weapon systems is now possible. The slowest 






of weapon systems - human operators - can now be efficiently 
replaced, in many cases, by high speed, highly capable micro-
processors. These tiny co~puters can be used in the weapon 
system control equipment, and owing to the min~ature ·1size~ 
even in the weapon itself. "These features have contributed 
to the achievement of DoD systems with greater performance, 
capability, and flexibility." (Patterson 1977) 
The hardware revolution has not been matched in other areas 
of computer systems technology. Even the most sophisticated of 
today's computers rely on human generated instructions, i.e. 
software, in order to perform even the simplest task. In an 
attempt to make this software production process more efficient, 
in hope that such efforts can increase the currently low output, 
various design and implementation techniques involve organizing 
the software package into modules which, within basic requirement 
specifications, can be developed by separate design teams, tested 
individually and then brought together. Using a sort of building 
block approach, different modules are integrated, tested, and 
then further integrated with additional modules. Figure 1 is 
a simplified illustration of this type of organization. Figure 
l is taken from Jensen and Tonies• Software Engineering, 1979. 
There are many variations on this basic methodology, and additional 
formally structured techniques which attempt to lend a sense 
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The creative efforts of software development personnel are 
applied through all phases of the process. Some efforts such 
as actual coding of the software instructions can be extremely 
labor intensive, and require extensive and continuous quality 
assurance. 
Despite the ever increasing application of software engi-
neering concepts, the gap between hardware and software continues 
to widen. One reason has to do with the enormous increase in 
the complexity and size of software packages demanded. The 
easier access to computers has created a new generation of users, 
more sophisticated in their requirements, and eager to computer-
ize more and more applications. "The increasing complexity 
of systems and application software has nearly overwhelmed us." 
{Jensen and Tonies 1979) 
Seriously aggravating the entire software industry problem 
is a shortage of talented programmers. "The demand for computer 
programmers already outstrips supply by at least 50,000, and 
that gap is likely to widen. Barring major changes in software 
technology, the need for programmers could reach 1.5 million 
by 1990, more than triple the number working today." (Business 
Week, Sept. 1980) Software developers have two choices: pay 
greatly elevated salaries to acquire and retain programming 
talent, or accept less quality at lower salaries, and anticipate 
higher output error rates. Both choices have one thing in 
common -- increased costs, which are, of course, passed on to 
the product consumer. 
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For t h e computer purchaser , the bottom line is escalating 
softwa r e costs. Before the hardware breakthrough, "the concept 
of spending more on software than hardware was difficult to 
perceive for most man agers and bu y ers". (Jensen and Tonies 1979) 
Yet, as figure 2, p. 81, shows , this has been the reality for 
more t h an a decade. (Boehm 1973 ) 
As the nation's and perhaps the world's, largest sponsor 
of software development, the Department of Defense has a major 
concer n in minimizing the effects of the software crisis. In 
1976, DoD was spending over three billio n dollars per year on 
defense systems software alone . The need to improve DoD manage-
ment of software development was fully recognized by that time. 
(Symposium on Computer Software Engineering 1976) 
There has been progress. Software engineering concepts 
have been accepted, and in some cases ¥ mandated by DoD. (DoD 
Inst. 5000.29) Captain Ace and other program managers are ~ade 
aware of standardization, configuration control, and documentation 
r e quirements for software development efforts unde~ their purview. 
Captain Ace made it a point to acquaint himself with the vaTious 
software design and development terminology when this bopic was 
discussed in the training he rece~ved prior to tak~ng over his 
current project. 
The project acquisition strategy had provided for careful 
monitoring of contractor efforts in the area of so£tware 
package documentation and life cycle maintainability criteria. 
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While there has been some investigation of the integration 
of software systems into the total system configuration, within 
DoD, there is little to indicate an appreciation of or a concern 
for the unique aspects of software engineering methods and their 
potential impact on historical project management techniques. 
Figure 3. on page 83 is an excerpt from an Air Force study 
into the acquisition of embedded computer systems. While it 
does show some appreciation of the potential impact of a mod-
ularized organization approach to software development and 
design, it illustrates a less than complete understanding of 
the problem potential of this approach. Throughout the flow 
path shown, the presence of an iterative loop structure can be 
seen. This situation occurs when errors are discovered in the 
design or coding of a module, thereby requiring some correction 
of that portion of the module effected. 
The structure shown assumes that errors discovered are of 
such a trivial nature that the basic module organization itself 
is not effected. Yet, one of the loops passes through an activity 
block labelled " Software Redesigntt . Given the type of activity 
blocks shown in the chart, it seems possible that errors could be 
detected which would require a major organizational redesign 
of the affected module. What if this module were number (1,0,0) 
shown in figure l? The modules below (1,0,0) were designed and 
developed assuming a certain logical design of the module which 
would invoke their function. If a significant redesign of (l,0,0) 
was necessary, the effect of this effort on the functioning of 




























Verification I ., 
Testing 
(1,0 , 0) developed during integration with module (MAIN), the 
pre v ious integration testing between (1,0,0) and its &ubordinates 
would, at the least, require revalidation. It is conceivable 
that a complete redesign review of subsystem A might be required . 
The dotted lines in figure 3. have been added to indicate those 
additional impacts which the modular approach can have. 
Did the formulation of test and evaluation schedules in 
Captain Ace's program take into account this looping schedule 
structure? Probably not! Most schedules, even those which use 
advanced techniques such as PERT and CPM, assume a generally 
horizontal, one direction flow. In addition, time line allo-
cation within a schedule is normally based on the anticipated 
complexity of systems tests. The usual scenario, as applied to 
Captain Ace ' s project, called for separate, low density tests 
of individual warfare capabilities (ASW, AAW, ASUW) gradually 
moving to higher density, integrated tests of the entire system . 
The time line allocation would probably correspond to the test 
density and complexity. 
Experience with software engineering techniques has shown 
error detection rates as illustrated by figure 4. p. 85 (Jensen 
and Tonies 1979) The type of errors detected first in each phase 
are of the type which prevent actual execution of the software 
module, and which most often will require the looping structure 
discussed earlier. In each phase of testing, some validation 
of results obtained in previous phases may be required. This 

































INTEGRATION I OPERATIONS 
TESTING 
0 
I ,n (0 
one direction scheduling with time line allocation based on 
anticipated test complexity. 
Can Captain Ace's program recover? Th e decisions required 
at this point would have little to do wi t h th e causes of the 
slippage, and are beyond the purpose of this paper. In order 
to prevent similar problems, project managers and their teams 
must be aware of their potential for an attack of "software 
crisis syndrome". To do this, it is essential that they determine 
the exact application of software engineeri n g concepts in their 
program. This education must start wit h the issuance of the 
acquisition strategy and be an important part of contract pro-
posal preparation and bid evaluation, 
are considered appropriate: 
The following recommendations 
l. Request specific contractor software development method-
ology as part of the RFP/IFB. There are some general requirements 
already imposed by DoD in this area. Detailed contractor 
comments concerning software development techniques are important 
source selection considerations. No attempt should be made, however, 
to impose an absolute requirement for specific techniques in the 
RFP/IFB. 
2. Request contractors provide initial estimates of software 
package size, and their estimated/historical programming produc-
tivity. This will provide an indication of a contractor's 
present ability to meet the contract requirements, given his 
current manning level. If large increases in programming per-
sonne l would be required subsequent to award, program output 






3. Ensure schedulers reflect a detailed understanding of software 
engineering techniques in use. Updated output productivity and 
error rates are essential for efficient scheduling. Because 
programming is a people-based activity, correction of 1000 
lines of program code, for example, will generate some number of 
new errors in the new code based on the coding error rate. 
In addition, the human nature of the process belies the infer-
ential assumption that two programmers can code faster than one. 
Brook's Law is in effect: Adding manpower to an already late 
software project makes it later ... more software projects have 
gone awry for lack of calendar time than from all other causes 
combined". (Brooks 1975) 
It is not the purpose of this paper to discourage the use 
of software engineering in project acquisition. On the contrary, 
project managers and their projects can only benefit from its 
use. What is essential is that everyone involved know and 
understand how the game is being played. 
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